|
|
Polish-Swedish Wars: 1600-1629 by
Maps: Westrmann
atlas zur
The New |
|
Introduction During
this period
|
|
|
The main
town was |
|
|
Cause of the Polish-Swedish conflict. |
||
|
|
At
the end of the 16th century In 1588 Zygmunt Waza III (Sigismund Vasa) was elected King of the Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth. Part of his success was the desire that this would bring the two countries closer, end their conflicts and perhaps provide a much needed ally. Instead it was to lead to over a century of conflict and the eclipse of both countries by others. In 1594,
after the death of the King John III of |
|
|
Sigismund was not noted for his military skills, after some early successes on the 4th November he was defeated at Jonkoping. He was forced to come to terms with Charles and conceded to him in the Riksdag (Parliament). He left SWenden, which in the next two years came under the control of Charles and his supporters. This did not end his hope of obtaining the Swedish crown and to gain Polish support he gave the Commonwealth the disputed territory of Northern Estonia, which was then in Swedish hands. On 12th March 1600 Zygmunt incorporated Estonia into the Commonwealth. |
|
|
|
|
With the onset of winter the rivers and marshes froze solid
and Duke Charles recommenced his operations. At the end of December with
7,000 men and 80 cannon he attacked Dorpat. While
on 5th Jan 1601 3,000 men under Bengtsson moved for
Wolmar (Valmiera) - Kies. On 7th January 700 horse under Maciej
Dembinski defeated the Swedes near Kies, checking their advance. Soon however the unpaid
Polish-Lithuanian forces trickled home. Dorpat besieged
on 2nd January capitulated four days later. On the 10th February Wolmar was taken and seven days later Kies.
Charles
felt too weak to directly besiege the newly fortified town of On 10th March Karl Karlsson, son of Duke Charles, blockaded the town. The
siege proper did not begin until 28th March with the arrival of Charles and
the siege artillery train. The Swedes managed to take the town but the castle
withstood four attacks, being well prepared for defense. |
|
Discouraged
by the initial failure Duke Charles prepared for a blockade of the castle in
order to starve it into surrender. He placed 2,600 men within the town and
with his main forces he moved to Erlaa some 30 km
to the north. In mid April Charles entrusted command to Gyllenhjelm
and returned to Rewal (Talinn).
|
|
|
1601 Spring Summer Campaign (1) So
in the beginning of 1601 the Swedes had mastered a significant part of
The
success of the Swedish offensive had galvanised the
Sejm into passing taxes for the organisation
of a strong 20,000 army for a Livonian campaign. The Lithuanian Grand Hetman
Krzysztof Radziwill the "Thunderbolt"
dispatched Jan Sicinski to organise
the forces in |
|||
|
On
9th April Radziwill ordered the new forces to
concentrate at the end of April at Oniksztach. In
the beginning of May Radziwill sent most of these
forces to Sicinski. On 11th May with 800 men he
crossed the Dzwina at Kokenhauzen,
forcing the Swedes into the town and blockading them. He then sent for
reinforcements which increased the Commonwealth forces to 2,000 by the end of
the month. Meanwhile the new Grand Lithuanian Field Hetman Jan Karol Chodkiewicz (Jonas Karolis Chodkevicius) had moved on 11th May from Wilno to The
Swedes responded to the blockade with a relief force bringing supplies. Boat
transports moved along the Dzwina river and on 28th
May Gyllenhjelm left for Kokenhauzen.
The next day Sicinski met the Swedes a mile from Kokenhausen and forced them to retreat. The same day Radziwill arrived capturing the majority of the supplies
sent in the boats. With such a strong enemy force in the region Radziwill decided he had to deal with them. At the beginning of June he sent Sicinski with around 1,000 men, mainly cavalry, to Erlaa. They reached Erlaa in the evening of the same day. Gyllenhjelm with about 1,000 cavalry and 1,000 infantry, formed his cavalry on the left bank of the river Oger, its first line of 500 horse were in a narrow between hillocks. They were ordered to fire their pistols once and then attack the Poles and Lithuanians with cold steel. In order to 'assist' their morale he ordered the retreat to be partly barred by wagons. This left a gap of 3km near where he positioned his second line of cavalry. Under the fort on the right bank of the river he left his infantry. |
|
||
|
Sicinski
attacked the first line of Swedish cavalry with his hussars. The Swedes,
untrained for their new tactics, fired their pistols and broke. Next the
hussars smashed the second line of cavalry. The Lithuanian infantry attacked
the wagons and lay siege to the remnants in the buildings on the left wing of
the enemy. The Poles and Lithianians then looted
the Swedish camp. Gyllenhjelm managed to organize a
counter attack with his infantry, surprising the disorganised
Commonwealth troops. They regrouped on the eastern bank of the river and
waited for sunset. Gyllenhjelm felt unable to
continue the engagement, garrisoning the castle with his infantry and
retreating with his cavalry through Pebalg to Kies on 3rd June. Polish-Lithuanian losses were 54 and
Swedish 400. By
the middle of June the Polish-Lithuanian forces at Kokenhausen
reached just under 4,000 men with 16 canons. Radziwill
decided that any assault should be undertaken only after the arrival of the
siege artillery sent for from
In
the first half of June, Radziwill sent a strong
diversionary expedition under Sicinski. This force
captured Lemburg (Malpilis),
Nitau (Nitaure), Lurensburg (Launpils), Suntazi (Suntzel) and laid to
waste most of these areas. The
retention of Kokenhausen was of great importance to
Charles and in June he issued orders for the relief of the town, whose
garrison was being cut down by starvation. Due to the urgency Gyllenhjelm collected 4,000 cavalry, as well as 900
infantry and 17 field guns. He was unclear as to the positions of Radziwill's army and judged that the majority of the
cavalry would be positioned on the right bank of the Perse
with the infantry on the left in entrenchment's open at the rear. His aim was
to reach the Dzwina opposite Zelbork
(Selburg, Selpils) and
from the unexpected eastern direction surprise the entrenched
Polish-Lithuanian infantry and then to combine with the town forces to oppose
the Commonwealth's horse. His infantry were supplied with sharpened stakes
over 2m long to help deal with the enemy cavalry, while his cavalry had
orders to use their swords, rather than their pistols. On the 18th June Gyllenhjelm left Kies, travelling through Pebalg, Festen. On 22nd June he stopped some 20km from Kokenhausen. Warned
of the approaching relief force Radziwill decided
to confront them in front of the town. He kept his forces in readiness the
whole of the night 22 to 23 June, keeping them in one group shielded by the
river and fortified camps. The Swedish forces, having left in the night of
23rd, arrived within some 2km of the town at five in the morning where they
formed up for battle. The field of battle was raised along its edge with the Dzwina for some one and a half kilometers to a width of
about half a kilometer with the side nearest the river being steep and
falling more gently towards the field.
|
|||
|
1601
Spring Summer Campaign (2) The On
the approach of the Swedes, Radziwill left 500
infantry in entrenchments opposite the town under Otto Denhoff,
who had orders to maintain fire on the town. 150 men guarded the camp, and
with the rest he entered the field of battle. His force comprised around
3,000 men, of which some 400 were infantry with 9 canons. Radziwill,
observing the Swedes with both flanks protected either by the Dwina or the forest and wagons, decided to break them on
his right wing. He ordered both his first lines to attack the Swedish left
wing sending almost half his army. He had no intention of opposing the
immobile enemy infantry. While the Swedish right wing was to be tied up by Stabrowski assisted by 200 infantry and 5 cannons. In
reserve Radziwill left some 800-1000 men and 4
cannon. At
just after 7:00, on seeing the size of Polish-Lithuanian forces forming up
against his left wing, Gyllenhjelm reinforced this
wing with his skirmishers. With the lack of a reserve it was the only way to
strengthen them. Shortly after being struck by both of Chodkiewicz's
regiments the left Swedish wing became disorganised
but were soon supported by the second line. At this point the Swedes had a
numerical superiority (2,000:1,300) and the Poles and Lithuanians were
checked. Soon however Dorohostajski's unit quickly
passed the weak fire of the infantry and artillery and struck the engaged
Swede's flank. The force of the attack and its location ensured the collapse
of the Swedish horse who routed and their pursuit began. Gyllenhjelm,
glimpsed a chance of success leading his right wing in a quick attack against
Stabrowski. The Polish-Lithuanian cannons managed
only a salvo and the cavalry, seriously outnumbered, fled on being struck. The
Swedes, in their pursuit of the Polish-Lithuanian cavalry, became dispersed
and on reaching the flank of Radziwill's forces
were met by three hussar banners. Disorganized the Swedes broke and fled. (click here
for more details) |
|||
|
|
Gyllenhjelm, with 900 infantry and his artillery, occupied a
ruined farm in the centre of his formation and commenced its fortification.
He placed 2,000 cavalry on each wing, with about 1,200 horse in each first
line. To protect his right flank he positioned a line of wagons. The Poles and Lithuanians
arrived on the field of battle once the Swedes had formed up and Chodkiewicz sent out some hundred skirmishers to cover
the deployment of his forces:- (A) The
first line was composed 1,000 horse commanded by Chodkiewicz.
They comprised two regiments - Chodkiewicz's own
and Radziwill's. (B) In the
second line were two regiments of 300 horse each, on the right Christopher Dorohostajski, on the left Stabrowski. (C) The Huf Walny in the third line was
the Royal Grand Lithuanian Hetman's own forces (1,000-1,200 men, including
400 infantry) positioned on the highest ground from which the whole
battlefield could be seen. The Swedes also deployed a similar number of
skirmishers to counter the Polish-Lithuanian skirmishers |
||
|
Radziwill,
observing the Swedes with both flanks protected either by the Dwina or the forest and wagons, decided to break them on
his right wing. He ordered both his first lines to attack the Swedish left
wing sending almost half his army. He had no intention of opposing the
immobile enemy infantry. While the Swedish right wing was to be tied up by Stabrowski assisted by 200 infantry and 5 cannons. In
reserve Radziwill left some 800-1000 men and 4
cannon. At
just after 7:00, on seeing the size of Polish-Lithuanian forces forming up
against his left wing, Gyllenhjelm reinforced this
wing with his skirmishers. With the lack of a reserve it was the only way to
strengthen them. Shortly after being struck by both of Chodkiewicz's
regiments the left Swedish wing became disorganised
but were soon supported by the second line. At this point the Swedes had a
numerical superiority (2,000:1,300) and the Poles and Lithuanians were
checked. Soon however Dorohostajski's unit quickly
passed the weak fire of the infantry and artillery and struck the engaged
Swede's flank. The force of the attack and its location ensured the collapse
of the Swedish horse who routed and their pursuit began. Gyllenhjelm,
glimpsed a chance of success leading his
right wing in a quick attack against Stabrowski.
The Polish-Lithuanian cannons managed only a salvo and the cavalry, seriously
outnumbered, fled on being struck. The
Swedes, in their pursuit of the Polish-Lithuanian cavalry, became dispersed
and on reaching the flank of Radziwill's forces were
met by three hussar banners. Disorganised the
Swedes broke and fled. |
|||
|
It
took some time for Radziwill to collect his tired
units after their pursuit and strike the infantry. The cavalry failed on the
pikes and musket fire. It was only after the arrival at about noon of the
Polish-Lithuanian artillery that their resistance was broken. Most of the
infantry were killed. Overall
the Swedes lost 2,000, the Poles and Lithuanians 200. Gyllenhjelm
managed to gather 2,000 cavalry some 14km from the battlefield and wanted to
return to Kokenhausen to help the infantry but his
men would no agree. The |
|
||
VIDEO
AUDIO 
|
1601 Spring Summer Campaign (3) The
Swedish fleet landed new forces forces at Dynemunt on 19th June. Radziwill
sent Dorohostajski on 28th June, who dislodged the
Swedes in the middle of July. Meanwhile the poor relationship between the
hetmans worsened and Chodkiewicz, with 700 comrades
plus retainers, left Radziwill with 2,000 men. Meanwhile
Gyllenhjelm retreated through Kies
to Burtneck (Burtnieki)
to the Gyllenhjelm
stood in a fortified camp between Burtneck and Rujen and even though reinforcements arrived, among them Chodkiewicz, Radziwill decided
not to risk an attack and moved to Ronneburg on
23rd July. Ronneburg was a harder nut to crack than
Radziwill anticipated and by August illness and
desertions had reduced his army to some fourteen hundred men. Back
in Without
waiting for the arrival of all his forced, due to his concerns over the
besieged Ronneburg, Duke Charles left Pernau on 16th August. He marched along the coast to Salis where on around the 20th August he met up with Gyllenhjelm. This
move threatened Radziwill's lines of communication
and route of retreat to The
Polish-Lithuanian army was encumbered with 3,000 wagons and a sizable number
of cannon and at Nitau on 31st August Count On
2nd September Radziwill's forces reached |
|
|
|
Duke
Charles' army approached Without
heavy artillery, the Swedes attempted a surprise attack. On the 9th at two in
the morning 4,000 infantry attacked the fortifications at Kubsberg
and despite fierce resistance captured it and almost penetrated the town. Farensbach ejected them with his counter attack. With the
approach of the main Royal forces the Swedes retreated into their occupied
towns and castles. |
|
Overview 1601
Spring-Summer Campaign The
fundamental factor in the Questions
have been raised as to whether after Kokenhausen Radziwill should have struck at Gyllenhjelm
at Burtneck to destroy the Swedish forces. This
would have been imprudent bearing in mind the enemy's numerical superiority
and fortified position. The
Swedes did learn as their operations progressed. The Summer operations were
directed at their main target CONTINUE TO 1602 – 1606 OPERATIONS
|
Originally
published at www.jasinski.co.uk/wojna/index.htm