Polish-Swedish Wars: 1600-1629 by
Maps: Westrmann
atlas zur
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Military
Operations, 1607-1609 In 1607 most of the
Polish-Lithuanian forces in Undeterred by this failure he moved
for Pernau to repeat the same tactic. On reaching Salis he turned away from the main road moving through
the forests and marshes in order to avoid being spotted. The freezing
temperatures made travel easier, though drifts of deep snow were a problem,
but by 14th March the Polish-Lithuanian forces halted some 14km from Pernau. Word had reached Pernau
of Chodkiewicz's intentions and as a warning to the
locals cannons were fired. Unfortunately the Commonwealth forces thought that
they had been discovered and so rather than attacking they retreated to a
more secure position. The hetman struggled to control his forces, who
bitterly complained of their poor conditions and lack of provisions after the
recent arduous forced march. The Swedes meantime learnt of the presence of
the enemy forces but believed it was only a scouting party and not the main
Polish-Lithuanian army. Soon however Chodkiewicz
received news of the approach of Swedish reinforcements from Rewel, they were approximately 50km away and the hetman
felt he must act now before they arrived. At 1:00 am on 16th March he ordered
the attack. The small number of infantry he possessed meant he would need to
coax his disgruntled nobles to fight dismounted. It needed all of Chodkiewicz's skills of persuasion and pleading to
convince the nobles which he finally succeeded by taking his sabre in hand and walking towards the walls of the fort.
His men rushed in aid of their commander in the storming of the castle - at
least 7 banners took part, while a few banners remained protecting the
horses. Pernau town was most
accessible to the Poles and Lithuanians from the South as it was surrounded
on the North and West by the river. It had principally bastion fortifications
as well as a powerful artillery of over 100 cannon.
Two French engineers directed the operations to take the South gate, which
was to be destroyed by a petard carried by some 14 Scottish infantry. Despite
intensive defensive fire which inflicted some 20 casualties on the attackers
the bomb reached the gate and it was destroyed. Soon the Commonwealth forces
reached the castle and organised attacking fire at
which point the Swedes surrendered. The attack had lasted less than 3 hours,
killing 100 Swedes and wounding another 50, while the Poles/Lithuanians lost
50 with a similar number wounded. Meanwhile Mansfeld
had landed, with some 8,000 men, at Approaching the river Dwina Chodkiewicz felt too weak
to attempt to tackle Mansfeld's whole army. To gain
some advantage he spread word that reinforcements were coming from Around the middle of July Mansfeld, with around 6,000 men, besiged
Pernau basing his camp south of the town between
the sea. He surrounded the town, placing fieldworks and block houses to
defend against any relief force, as well as encircle the garrison. Chodkiewicz waited for reinforcements which arrived on
20th August, he collected almost 3,000 men and leaving a few hundred at Dynemuende he moved with the rest for Pernau.
By the begining
of September he reached forests some 30km from Pernau.
The Swedes attempted to destroy his force with a sudden night attack, though
they managed a surprise attack and forced their way into the
Polish-Lithuanian camp they were ejected and pushed back. The Swedes provided
a strong defence, closing tracks with felled trees
with the crowns facing the enemy. Chodkiewicz made
little headway against these obstacles so he avoided them travelling
some 40km to approach from an unexpected direction. Due to the closed coastal route and
the road from to Krakus Hetman almost certainly
moved East and then North East so as from the region of Felin
he could move West through the marshy terrain. Chodkiewicz
reached Pernau at midnight on 15th September.First destroyed the blockhouse near old Pernau and then commenced the construction of a bridge
across the Pernau river, aiming to take on the main
Swedish forces, threatening their envelopment. Mansfeld
attempted a surprise attack on Chodkiewicz's camp
but the Swedes were held back. He then moved through forests past the
Polish-Lithuanian camp and formed his own camp some 7km north on the road to Rewel in a strong position amongst forests between
marshes. Chodkiewicz, failing to
coax the Swedes to battle, and with disgruntled forces decided on retreat. He
strengthened his garrison in Pernau with 1,000 men
and provisions and on 22nd September moved south. Mansfeld
followed the Poles and Lithuanians with some 3,000 French cavalry and 2,000
Swedish infantry, as well as an unknown number of Dutch and Scots. On 29th
September Commonwealth forces entered the camp at Dynemuende.
In November Mansfeld
approached and attempted to secretly resupply the Dynemuende garrison. At first Chodkiewicz
was able to observe the Swedes sufficiently to cut off their route to the
fort in time. But on 6th November Mansfeld's evaded
Chodkiewicz and moved directly to the Hetman's
camp. The camp was situated near some heights and in the camp were only a few
hundred rajtars and Cossacks. Mansfeld
with 2,000 men sent part of his forces to eject the the
forces in the camp leaving the remainder on the high ground. On news of this
the Hetman sent to the camp two regiments (T. Dabrowa & Aleksander Holowczynski), these
after combined with the defeated units and then struck the Swedes positioned
in front of the camp and decisively defeating them. Swedish reinforcements moving from Dynemuende were met by Polish-Lithuanian forces near the Dzwina and crushed against the river in where many Swedes
drowned. 12 standards and all the canon were taken. Mansfeld
decided not to leave his advantageous position on the heights, possibly
remembering Kircholm and slowly began to withdraw. Chodkiewicz sent forces in pursuit and succeeded in
capturing canons and two standards. This pursuit triggered the collapse of
the Swedish forces and the Dynemuende garrison,
which was close to starvation, surrendered on 9th November. At the same time
the Polish-Lithuanian cavalry confederated and went home. Activity
in Muscovy distracted both the Swedes and the Commonwealth away from
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Eastern Europe
Overview 1609 Campaign The 1609 campaign had a transitional Character
between the Polish-Lithuanian victories of 1601-05 and the later successes of
Gustaf Adolph (1621-1629). Tactically the Poles and Lithuanians were significantly ahead of
the Swedes but they could not repeat the destructive success of a Kircholm or Kokenhausen. The
Swedes avoided open battle, carefully protecting themselves with defences or natural obstacles. However they also took
advantage of surprise attacks, often under cover of darkness. Even where they
were caught out, though defeated and disorganised,
they managed to avoid total destruction such as that at Kircholm. But the brilliance of Chodkiewicz
still shines through. Operating with small forces in difficult conditions he
achieved many successes. Surprising the Swedes with quick forced marches in
unexpected directions. Even where he was surprised he was able to improvise
and turn defeat into victory. CONTINUE TO 1621 – 1629 OPERATIONS
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Originally
published at www.jasinski.co.uk/wojna/index.htm