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A HISTORY OF MODERN Jorg Hirsch
/ Kim Travnor (translation) Andrew Andersen (map editing for web version) Longman London and |
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CHAPTER SIX 'HE WHO IS NOT AGAINST US, IS WITH US' After the crushing of the spontaneous
popular uprising in 1956, Kádár was a publicity-shy man who felt an
aversion towards any form of personality cult. According to the few known and
often contradictory details of his life, he was born János Czermanik, son of
a rural labourer, in 1912 in the Adriatic When, in the early hours of the morning of 7
November 1956, Kádár returned under Soviet escort to the scene of the
fighting in Krushchev may well have urged Kádár to take
a tougher line when the former visited Kádár's compliance in what was a difficult
situation was rewarded with a series of significant Soviet concessions. A
Soviet-Hungarian Pact, signed in Assured of massive Soviet protection and
backing, Kádár also succeeded in fending off his 'dogmatic' critics. He had
decreed the creation of a new Central Committee Secretariat for the party,
which had grown to 225,000 members by 1 April 1957. Apart from himself, its
members included Jenő Fock, the former leader of the Trade Union
Federation, Kállai, Kiss and Marosán. They supported Kádár's rejection of the
criticisms made by the earlier party ideologue, József Révai, who had
returned from Soviet exile. He called on the regime to give up its relatively
'liberal' course, return to the old Stalinist methods of repression and fully
reinstate Rákosi and Gerő. Once Krushchev had defeated the 'anti-party
opposition' in the Soviet Communist Party, he did not hesitate to give Kádár
his full support, thus pulling the carpet from under the feet of At this early stage almost all of the
country's creative artists, like the vast majority of the population, who had
generally lapsed into the doldrums and a mood of resignation, adopted an
attitude of passive rejection towards Kádár's régime. But, since The MSZMP and the government took special
pains to persuade peasants to rejoin the agricultural cooperatives after they
had left them en masse during the 1956 uprising. By 31
December 1956, only 2,089 collectives were still operating with approximately
100,000 farmers and 120,000-members cultivating a mere 6.1 per cent of the
country's arable land. Ferenc Münnich, who replaced Kádár as prime minister
on 28 January 1958, and his agricultural minister, Imre Dögei, were willing
to try to win over the peasants by persuasion. By the end of 1958, a total of
143,229 farms were members of the country's 3,507 cooperatives. On 7
December, however, the Central Committee decided to speed up the pace of
collectivisation and approved coercive measures against the Kulaks, by which
they meant any peasant opposed to the compulsory incorporation of private
land into the cooperatives. Although declining productivity made brief pauses
for consolidation necessary, the government proudly announced on 30 September
1961 that 1.07 million farms had been organised into 4,546 collectives employing
1,195 million members. In all, 95.6 per cent of all farmland, including 81.1
per cent farmed by cooperatives, had already been incorporated into the
'Socialist sector', while the remaining 16.4 per cent of land managed by
collectives remained private farms of about half a hectare for the peasant's
own use. Thanks to intensive cultivation methods, however, these farms
produced a total of 40 per cent of the entire agricultural production of the
cooperatives. Thus, 46 per cent of all meat production, 79 per cent of
poultry, 90 per cent of eggs, 60 per cent of milk and 80 per cent of fruit
was supplied by these individual allotments. Over the years that followed the government
adopted a policy of allowing peasants a part share in labour-intensive and
delicate cultures, e.g. viticulture, tobacco-growing and market gardening.
Peasants who worked in these areas had their efforts rewarded by being
allowed to retain a third of their yield. But despite more intensive
mechanisation and the increased use of fertilisers, average yields still
lagged behind those recorded in the pre-war years. The summer drought of 1961
and the poor harvests of 1963 and 1964 made it necessary to import large
amounts of Canadian maize, which could only be paid for after the The renewed deterioration in the Soviet
Union's relations with As a result of this 'anti-revisionist
campaign', many veteran Stalinists were encouraged to return to Hungary from
their Soviet exile and seek readmission to the party and state apparatus from
which they had been banned by a Central Committee resolution of February
1958. The wave of purges which was now set in motion against 'revisionists'
and 'nationalists' cost several thousand army officers, police officials and
many civil servants their party membership and positions. On 16 June 1958 the
execution of Imre Nagy, General Pál Maléter and two other leaders of the
uprising charged with 'conspiracy and creating a secret organisation aimed at
forcibly seizing power and overthrowing the Hungarian People's Democracy' was
officially announced in Despite this loss of credibility, 98.4 per
cent of the electorate voted in the elections to the National Assembly and
Soviets on 16 November 1958. Of this figure, 99.6 per cent voted for the
MSzMP's single list of candidates. Of the 338 deputies elected, 139 were
party officials and 53 were members of the Central Committee. Even Béla
Kovács, the former General Secretary of the Party of Smallholders, who had
been abducted by the Soviets in February 1947 and first returned to Hungary
in 1956, won a seat which illness prevented him from occupying until his
death in 1959. The satisfactory election result could not, however, hide the fact
that broad sections of the population had remained politically completely
passive and felt alienated by the restrictive cultural policy of orthodox
Stalinism. Kádár openly acknowledged the population's basic attitude at the
MSzMP's Seventh Party Congress, held between 30 November and 5 December 1959,
when he remarked that 'the revolution on the cultural front lags behind the
results achieved in the political and economic spheres'. Since the original Hungarian Communist Party
(MKP) and its successor (from 1948), the Hungarian Worker's Party (MDP), had
both held three party conferences each up until this point, Kádár did not
hesitate to designate the MSzMP's first congress the 'Seventh' Party
Congress, thus legitimising it in terms of the continuity and tradition of
Hungary's Communist movement. In all, 669 delegates represented 402,456 party
members organised in 17,000 various organisations. The Communist Youth League
accounted for a further 380,000 members. The party gave itself a new
organisational statute intended to ensure 'democratic centralism' and its
implementation. Kádár's foreign policy, aimed at compromise, and Endre Sík,
his foreign minister from 1958 onwards, who, despite growing tensions, tried
hard to maintain good relations with Peking and Tirana and did not break off
relations with Belgrade, was expressly praised by Krushchev, who attended the
congress and again emphasised the Soviet Union's willingness to stand by its
friends in Hungary at any time against the enemies of Socialism. Kádár's
gratitude for the Soviet Union's earlier 'fraternal assistance' and its new
offer of support culminated in a request for Soviet troops to remain in Close personal, one might almost say
friendly, relations and close political contacts with Krushchev subsequently
influenced Kádár's relationship with the These expulsions were intended to mark an
end to the Stalinist past and the 'violation of Socialist legality'. At the
party's Central Committee's plenary meetings in March and August 1962,
responsibilities for the leadership's actions in the Stalinist era were
openly admitted -- though without mentioning Kádár's and Antal Apró's role in
events. It was decided to rehabilitate and compensate the victims, and offers
of clemency for the behind-the-scenes organisers of the show trials were also
discussed. Mihály Farkas, Rákosi's right-hand man who died in 1965, and the
ex-head of the ÁVH, Péter, were released from prison in 1960, the latter
being demoted to a librarian's post. Ernő Gerő, who was by now
almost totally blind, was allowed to return to In January 1962, Kádár had paraphrased a
verse from the New Testament ( Matthew12.V.30)
when he confidently remarked, 'Whereas the Rákosi régime used to say
"He, who is not for us is against us", we say "He, who is not
against us, is with us and welcomed by us".' This maxim also dominated
the party's Eighth Party Congress, held between 20 and 24 November 1962 when
it was announced that the régime had achieved the realisation of the basic
principles of Socialism and that the Hungarian people was now entering a
phase of 'complete Socialist construction'. The key economic issue at the congress
was how to implement the restructuring of Hungarian industry. Socialist
culture would also have to be more strongly developed and contribute to
raising the Socialist consciousness of the masses. The 614 delegates at the
congress now represented 511,965 party members and candidates, who decided in
favour of 'collective leadership as the sine
qua non for the further
democratisation of political and social life' in a new version of the party's
statutes and extended the powers of the Central Committee which now numbered
81 members. The supporters of Kádár's 'centralist' line occupied all the
places in the Politburo. The master printer, Rezső Nyers, who had
managed to attain the post of finance minister, now joined the Central
Committee Secretariat and pushed through a major economic reform. The party
had the state apparatus and the administration of the economy so firmly under
control that Kádár was able to announce his intention to come some way
towards satisfying popular demands for a higher standard of living and for
greater personal freedom -- though only within certain limits. The leading
ideologue and Central Committee Secretary, István Szirmai, began cautiously
to satisfy the desire of many Hungarians to travel abroad, which had been
stimulated by increased opportunities to establish contacts and acquire
information. The result was that the number of foreign travel permits to the
West soared from 35,000 in 1960 to 143,000 within seven years and thereafter
leapt to over 3.8 million by 1980. Although bitter memories of the Rákosi
period and the bloody crushing of the popular uprising were still very much
alive, more and more Hungarians managed to identify with Kádár's cautious
pragmatism and relative liberalism. The party had made it a growing priority
to mediate between the Kremlin's insistence on conformity within the
Socialist Bloc and the expectations and needs of the Hungarian people. Since they
had no illusions regarding the true nature of Communist rule and were
dependably loyal in national matters, the Hungarians seized the opportunities
which Kádár's political system offered them. The leadership realistically
appraised the political, strategic and economic realities in order to allow
the possibility of a restricted pluralism in internal affairs. A liberal
policy on censorship allowed more freedom of speech, the principles of
justice were to a large extent observed and totalitarian oppression no longer
existed. The programme of Socialist renewal which Kádár purposefully pursued
regardless of any setbacks, gave the Hungarians more individual and
intellectual freedom, a modest degree of affluence and a satisfactorily
functioning economy without parallel in the other Communist countries of
eastern Europe. increased opportunities to establish
contacts and acquire information. The result was that the number of foreign
travel permits to the West soared from 35,000 in 1960 to 143,000 within seven
years and thereafter leapt to over 3.8 million by 1980. Although bitter memories of the Rákosi
period and the bloody crushing of the popular uprising were still very much
alive, more and more Hungarians managed to identify with Kádár's cautious
pragmatism and relative liberalism. The party had made it a growing priority
to mediate between the Kremlin's insistence on conformity within the
Socialist Bloc and the expectations and needs of the Hungarian people. Since
they had no illusions regarding the true nature of Communist rule and were
dependably loyal in national matters, the Hungarians seized the opportunities
which Kádár's political system offered them. The leadership realistically
appraised the political, strategic and economic realities in order to allow
the possibility of a restricted pluralism in internal affairs. A liberal
policy on censorship allowed more freedom of speech, the principles of justice
were to a large extent observed and totalitarian oppression no longer
existed. The programme of Socialist renewal which Kádár purposefully pursued
regardless of any setbacks, gave the Hungarians more individual and
intellectual freedom, a modest degree of affluence and a satisfactorily
functioning economy without parallel in the other Communist countries of
eastern Europe. REFORM HUNGARIAN STYLE The Three Year Plan, launched in 1958 in
place of the interrupted Five Year Plan, proved moderately successful in
overcoming the country's economic problems in the wake of the 1956 uprising,
but failed to achieve any real economic growth. The accelerated pace of
agricultural collectivisation and the economic problems experienced by the
other east European Socialist states also had a major effect on Hungary, with
the result that the Party Central Committee approved the so-called 'Second'
Five Year Plan for the development of the economy on 12 September 1961. The
targets set by the State Planning Office continued to give priority to the
encouragement of heavy industry, but also recognised the need for the rapid
expansion of the chemicals industry and the provision of machinery, improved
seeds and fertilisers for the agricultural sector. As early as 1961, there
was a visible shift away from fixing illusory growth targets in favour of
relaxing economic planning constraints by giving enterprises more freedom in
decision-making, encouraging individual initiative and tolerating the
acquisition of private property and pursuit of profit. It was hoped that
increased output and improved productivity and technology would raise
industrial production by 50 per cent, the GNP by 35 per cent and real income
by 16-17 per cent before the end of 1965. Closer cooperation among the member
states of Comecon, the provision of Soviet loans and preferential trading
terms with the western industrial countries which granted Hungary the status
of 'most favoured' trading partner almost made it possible to fulfil the
plan's targets. The realisation that the Socialist economy
would not automatically replace 'outdated individualism' with a 'collective
social awareness' also helped the party stimulate the work-effort of ordinary
Hungarians and thus increase productivity by allowing a measure of personal
gain. In view of The small remaining group of Rákosi
supporters in Even more significant, however, was the fact
that the Soviet leadership did not oppose the economic reforms introduced in Discussion of the New Economic Mechanism
also dominated the MSzMP's Ninth Party Congress, held between 28 November and
3 December 1966. The delegates resolved that 'the complete construction of
Socialism remained . . . the historic task of the party and people'. The
legal rights of the local party branches were also increased in keeping with
the aim of furthering the development of Socialist democracy. Democracy
within the factories was to be strengthened and in particular the National
Assembly's participation in the political decision-making process extended.
The leadership role of the party, which now numbered 585,000 members, was to
be maintained, although its main task was given as the 'scientific analysis
and building up of its political control of the masses and their organisation
and mobilisation'. At a sitting on 14 April, the parliament, returned on 19 March
on the basis of a new electoral law of 11 November 1966, which for the first
time provided for more candidates than there were seats, appointed Pál
Losonczi as Chairman of the Presidium and Kádár's loyal supporter, Jenő
Fock, as the new prime minister in place of Kállai. MSzMP party members
already comprised 35 per cent workers and 8 per cent peasants. The
'intelligentsia', i.e. members with a completed vocational training or
white-collar workers, made up 38 per cent, government employees, civil
servants and members of the armed forces 7.9 per cent. A further 9 per cent
were retired or in receipt of a pension. Although women accounted for 51.6
per cent of the population, only 22.9 per cent were party members. Between 75
and 80 per cent of the National Assembly deputies, of whom about half gave
their occupation as 'worker', were party members, with the result that the
Electoral Association of the Patriotic Popular Front was no threat to the
party's monopoly of power and the one-party system. Independent initiatives
by the Assembly, which, according to Article 19 of the constitution, was 'the
supreme organ of state power and representation of the people', was,
therefore, narrowly limited, although its sphere of competence was supposed
to include legislation, advising on and consenting to the government's
programme, consenting to the budget, participating in formulating economic
planning, ratifying international agreements and electing members to the
Presidium and Council of Ministers. In view of their own painful experience, the
Hungarians observed the developments leading up to the 'Prague Spring' of 1968 and the Soviet intervention in The Hungarians' desire to find answers to
these questions, which would accord with the pace of the country's economic
development and the 'principle of national independence', was noted in Moscow
with some reservation, although Hungary's economists had been able to show at
the end of 1969 that, thanks to the NEM, the growth rate in national income,
which had previously been constantly declining, had risen for the first time
(from 4.5 per cent in 1968 to 6 per cent in 1969) and the volume of foreign trade
had increased by 14 per cent. The government's reforms in the agricultural
sector proved less successful. The law stipulated that the agricultural
cooperatives would have to decide themselves how to the use the means of
production, develop their own produce and find its market value. They would
also have to do their own risk-taking and earn their own profits as befitted
their entrepreneurial independence. The collective farms, which had been
previously largely subsidised by the state were allowed to increase their
prices by 9 per cent in 1966 and by a further 10 per cent between 1968 and
1970. At the same time, the government cancelled the major portion of any
losses they had incurred and extended the repayment period of short-term
loans. From now on two-thirds of the collectives began to show a profit. But
only when they were allowed to indulge in activities outside of horticulture
and livestock rearing by taking on the tasks normally associated with
industry, transport and trade were they able to raise their incomes on
average by 25 per cent (in exceptional cases, by 60 per cent) and increase
their productivity. But with average yields of 32.3 quintals per hectare for
maize and 24.3 quintals for wheat, In certain Hungarian circles as well as in
neighbouring Socialist states and especially in the Kremlin concern was felt
at the NEM's unavoidable political side-effects. In order to function
properly it required a loosening up of the ossified system of centralised
decision-making under the control of the party leadership. The population was
to be given improved conditions in the consumer sector and greater individual
freedoms, including greater security before the law. While the Soviet
leadership refrained from openly criticising the Hungarian Communists,
warnings on a personal level and responses designed to calm fears were
exchanged on several occasions between 1968 and 1970 without significant
results. After talks with premier Fock and Péter during his visit to Hungary
between 14 and 18 November 1968 the Russian foreign minister, Gromyko,
emphasised the need to 'develop the unity and security of the Socialist
states further'. The 'unity of the Communist movement' was also the main
subject of talks which Kádár attended in Moscow between 6 and 10 February
1969 and formed a side issue at the Budapest summit held in March 1969, when
a radical reform of the Warsaw Pact's command structure was discussed. Kádár
had to dispel the anxieties of his Soviet guests that Thus, at the MSzMP's Tenth Party Congress,
held in Budapest at the end of November 1970, Brezhnev felt obliged to give
his blessing to Hungary's reform programme: 'This principled attempt to solve
the most important problems encountered in the development of Socialist
society is fully understood by the Communists of the Soviet Union who view it
with great respect.' In gratitude for this gesture Kádár made a point of
reaffirming his loyalty to the It was at this conference that Kádár
expressed the opinion, 'that the time is not yet ripe to proclaim our country
a Socialist republic. We believe that it is preferable to get on with the
construction [of Socialism] and worry about the change of name later.'
Nevertheless, the government did not hesitate to show that it was prepared to
depart from the well-worn path of restrictive Communist internal policy and
place its trust in its citizens' political maturity. It introduced a modest
measure of local self-government subject to state supervision (Law I of
1971), made spectacular trade deals with the West, raised a long-term loan on
the Eurodollar market, improved relations with the Catholic Church and the These economic difficulties resulted in a
short-term cooling of relations between the Soviet and Hungarian Communists.
The Kremlin appeared to be particularly annoyed by The extent of the Kremlin's annoyance at
these intensified contacts can be seen from the fact that the Soviet press
for the first time made no mention of the obligatory declarations of
friendship when Hungary celebrated its liberation on 4 April 1972. Instead,
the Hungarian party and government were warned not to 'revert to bourgeois
nationalism'. Also, premier Fock's trip to The Hungarians openly admitted encountering
difficulties in implementing their economic reforms and it proved impossible
to fulfil the plan's targets. There was a further increase in This warning was given concrete form in a
decree issued by a plenary executive meeting of the Central Committee in
November 1972. Despite the country's difficult economic situation, it ordered
substantial wage rises for 1.3 million workers in industry and the building
trades, while at the same time declaring war on 'bourgeois manifestations'
and 'ultra-left views' which were to be eradicated on account of their
inherent 'anti-Socialist tendencies'. When on 15 March 1973, the 125th
anniversary of the revolt against Habsburg rule, a 'nationalist
demonstration' was held in But When Brezhnev visited the Soviets' willingness to compromise on
the economic front. On 15 December 1973, Although it was already clear by this stage
that the unrealistic targets of the Fourth Five Year Plan, due to run until
the end of 1975, could not be fulfilled, the population did not have to put
up with too much austerity, despite regular, though modest price rises.
Enterprises allowed a relatively large measure of freedom in decision-making
and interested in signing cooperation agreements with western companies,
remained unaffected, even though Hungary was once more closely tied down to
working within the framework of Comecon agreements on the common industrial
development of eastern Europe and its future economic strategy. The
exaggerated expressions of warmth and 'full mutual agreement' at every
bilateral meeting of party and government chiefs were not, however,
sufficient to allow Kádár -- who judged the population's mood exactly -- to
forget his countrymen's reservations towards Soviet domination. In view of
Hungary's great dependence on Russian consignments of raw materials, together
with a chronic shortage of foreign exchange and the country's advanced
integration into Comecon, Kádár was forced to rule out any possibility of
going it alone economically and was prepared to accept certain restrictions
in order to avoid even more far-reaching demands, not to mention another
Soviet intervention in Hungary's internal affairs. Attempts by Nyers'
Politburo successor, Károly Németh, during a visit to In his leadership address to the MSzMP's
Eleventh Party Congress, held between 17 and 22 March 1975 in the
Ferenc-Rósza Cultural Centre in Budapest, Kádár thought it necessary to make
a further pledge of loyalty to Hungarian-Soviet friendship in Brezhnev's
presence: 'We regard the strength of our indissoluble fraternal friendship
with the Soviet Union as especially important. It gives us the greatest
satisfaction that Hungarian-Soviet relations have been deepened and extended
to all areas; that they have uccessfully served the common interests of our
countries and their peoples, and strengthened our alliance, cooperation and
friendship.' In an express reference to the 30th anniversary of the
'liberation of our homeland by the Soviet army' (4 April), the congress
delegates voted unanimously on a new resolution for inclusion in the party
programme. This was the 'decree on party work und further tasks', which aimed
at a more committed application of ideology not only as regards the party,
but government activity and every sphere of public life. Recognition of the
workers' importance, their increasing influence on internal management
decisions, the appointment of a growing number of manual workers to important
positions in the state and party machinery and the step-by-step assimilation
of all sections of the population into the working class were proclaimed as
the most important goals for the future. Although G. Aczél was re-elected to
the new thirteen-man Politburo, the four new members of this leading body:
the increasingly prominent deputy prime minister, Lázár, the First Secretary
of the Communist Youth League, László Maróthy, Central Committee Secretary,
Miklós Óvári and the Patriotic Popular Front's General Secretary, István
Sarlós, ensured that the government's reform policies, though not entirely
halted, would not receive any fresh impetus for the time being. The official announcement on 15 May 1975
that the prime minister, Jenő Fock, had resigned on health grounds was
greeted with widespread astonishment. Fock, who had only recently been
elected to the Politburo, was replaced by his previous deputy, György Lázár,
who had been his permanent representative in Comecon and was regarded as a
critic of the liberal NEM policy. In the May 1975 issue of the party's
intellectual journal Társadalmi
Szemle (Social Panorama) Lázár catalogued the NEM's
weaknesses, rendered even more acute by the effects of an economic recession
in the West, and suggested as a solution 'the more systematic pursuit of the
[party's] political and economic line . . . at the same time as raising
productivity' and 'participating even more actively [in Comecon's]
international division of labour'. The newly elected National Assembly of 15
June 1975, which saw the Patriotic Popular Front candidates returned with the
approval of 99.6 per cent of the electorate, unanimously approved Lázár's new
government with its many ministerial changes when it was officially announced
on 4 July. Two days previously a plenary executive meeting of the Central
Committee had appointed two more members to the Politburo: deputy prime
minister, István Huszár, and Presidium chairman, Pál Losonczi. In the mid- 1970s, Hungary's standard of
living continued to rise as a result of an annual increase of as much as 6
per cent in real incomes. There was an initial wave of mechanisation,
accompanied by a sudden growth in meat consumption and a new spate of
building construction, albeit still inadequate to cover needs. However, these
developments appeared threatened, as long as the government did not succeed
in resolving the 'differences in the method and extent of economic
cooperation', repeatedly mentioned in communiqués issued after bilateral
meetings with the Soviet government. The prices of raw materials demanded by
the Soviet Union for the new period of the Five Year Plan and the small
returns produced by Hungarian products threatened By 1978, the Fifth Five Year Plan, which
aimed at increasing Hungary's national income by 30 to 32 per cent, its total
industrial production by as much as 35 per cent and the population's real
income by 18 to 20 per cent, had resulted in a rapid increase in production.
However, the sudden growth in western imports was partly responsible for a
worrying deterioration in the balance between the country's external and
internal economic performance. In order to check excess demand, consumer
prices were subjected to sharp, regular increases, while real incomes remained
relatively static. On 1 January 1977, a tax reform was also introduced to
help prevent the growth of economic disparities. It allowed considerable
exemption from duties paid on profits from agricultural side-line activities,
while making the profits of small private firms liable to a strict
progressive tax. The same end was served by a reformed prices policy,
introduced from the 1980s onwards, which regulated the cost of raw materials
according to world market prices and forced state enterprises to operate under
the rules of the free market economy, even in the domestic market. However, the overall economic stability
achieved by these measures restricted economic growth, with the result that
the Five Year Plan's quotas could not be fulfilled in every area. For
example, the national income rose by only 17 per cent overall and real per
capita income by a total of only 8 per cent. For the first time This generally positive development in The workers also gained themselves a hearing
following the implementation of the second round of NEM reforms. They not
only demanded more freedom of information and honest government to help
improve their understanding of the political and economic decision-making
processes, but pressed for a greater degree of industrial democracy. The
ground rules on workers' participation in the management of firms, laid down
in a joint resolution of the Council of Ministers and the Central Council of
Trade Unions, essentially limited participation to the signing of collective
agreements and social welfare policy. As a result, the power of
decision-making on questions of production and type and quality of product
still remained entirely in management hands. When the workers were forced to
accept a decline in the purchasing power of their real earnings as a result
of slower economic growth and the regular fixing of prices according to
production costs, the workers began to adopt a more realistic attitude. The
leaders of the trade unions and the party reacted swiftly in order to avoid a
similar situation arising to that in This development, which coupled the
rewarding of good performance by incentive payments with consistent
maintenance of the government's general reform policies, had its critics. But
Kádár knew at every stage how to keep the sceptics in check. In April 1977,
the head of the Central Committee Secretariat, József Sándor, was forced to
make way for István Katona, the former chief editor of the main party
newspaper Népszabadság,
who was replaced in turn by the rector of the Even more sweeping personnel changes were
subsequently decided upon at the party's Twelfth Congress, held between 24
and 27 March 1980. With the sanction of the 764 delegates, representing 811,
833 party members in all, Kádár took it upon himself immediately to dismiss
five of the fifteen Politburo members and to undertake a major shake-out of
the 127-man strong Central Committee. As well as Béla Biszku and former
premier, Jenő Fock, even the 48-year-old chief of planning and deputy
prime minister, István Huszár, had to give up his post. Huszár had shown
himself to be a committed economic reformer and had won considerable respect
from the Hungarian public as a result of his outspoken criticisms, but lacked
a power base within the party. Since Huszár was not made a scapegoat for In addition, a number of important personnel
changes took place in the government following the National Assembly
elections of 8 June 1980. Although a 'mere' 97 per cent of the electorate
cast their vote, 99.3 per cent of unspoiled votes were polled in favour of
Patriotic Popular Front candidates. At the same time, the government tried to improve bureaucratic efficiency by
merging the ministries into bigger units. As was to be expected, the chairman
of the State Planning Council, Huszár, after losing his Politburo membership,
had to vacate his government post and was replaced by the former finance
minister, Lajos Faluvégi. Apart from Lázár, whose position as premier was
unchallenged, his deputy, György Aczél, was the only government minister to
hold on to his position in the Politburo. Lázár argued that the tendency to
separate the machinery of party and state was in keeping with the
government's reforms, since these were intended to liberate economic
development from political constraints, especially as regards the selection
of personnel. Although Kádár, whose strict Calvinist morality led him to
criticise the personal affairs of the defence minister, Lajos Czinege, knew
how to prevent this military man, whom Moscow held in high regard, from
joining the Politburo, he had to retain him in the government because of his
Soviet backing. But he was not able to persuade the unpopular and
increasingly isolated foreign minister, Puja, who also had Kremlin backers,
to give up his post until 7 July 1983. He was replaced by Péter Várkonyi, a
former chief editor of Népszabadság who, from 1982 onwards, was head of
the Central Committee Secretariat with responsibility for international
affairs. As early as 23 July 1982, Kádár's loyal supporter, György Aczél, who
had been ousted as Central Committee Secretary in 1974 at the Soviets'
insistence, replaced the 'dogmatist', András Gyenes, as head of the Central
Committee departments responsible for cultivating contacts with other
Communist parties. This office was particularly important,
since The mistrust which the Socialist Bloc
countries showed towards the Hungarian experiment no doubt arose from the
fear that the party risked losing its control over the process of gradual
liberalisation and a situation might then have been created in which its
monopoly of power was challenged. The Hungarian Communists were reminded of
the events of 1956 and warned against allowing any socio-economic and
political climate to arise which would force fellow Socialist states to
intervene in order to put the country back on the rails. The internal
political freedoms which were granted to Hungary caused both concern and no
doubt envy in the other Socialist countries; an example being Kádár's
sympathetic remarks on the 'Eurocommunism' of the West European Communists.
In the discussion which suddenly emerged in 1976-77 on 'separate paths'
towards socialism and the role of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the
Hungarian party moved substantially towards adopting the Italian Communist
Party's position. A Central Committee resolution of 20 April 1978, expressly
stated, 'that the realisation of the different historical tasks faced by each
Communist and workers' party in different countries' demanded that each
'evaluate the concrete circumstances and stipulate the tasks' ahead of them.
'We regard it as natural that the parties decide their own strategy and
tactics for themselves.' On 19 November 1978, during the celebrations to mark
the 60th anniversary of the founding of the Hungarian Communist Party, Kádár
also declared that 'on the basis of our experiences the theory of
Marxism-Leninism is an indispensable weapon in the revolutionary struggle of
the working class. It is also well known that the theory of Marxism-Leninism
is not a dogma but a guide to action and to the concrete analysis of concrete
situations.' At its Twelfth Party Congress the First Secretary was
nevertheless able to record with satisfaction in his summary address on 24
March 1980, that 'The party's leading role is a reality in the life of our
society. Its relationship with the masses is one of mutual trust. The party's
policies have the active support of our people.' On the other hand, it was Kádár's open
admissions that nationalist, cosmopolitan, revisionist, ultra-left and other
dangerous views' still existed in Hungary and his avowals that there was no
reason to remain content with the 'Socialist democracy' which had been
achieved that caused the Soviets to reveal their anxieties. Hungary's
increased contacts with capitalist countries, the noticeable reserve with
which Hungary viewed Russia's intervention in Afghanistan, developments in
Budapest's close ally, Poland, Soviet condemnation of China's heretical
Communists or the USA's I warmongering actions', caused the Kremlin to point
at every opportunity to Hungary's major economic dependence on imports of
Russian raw materials and insist on even closer cooperation within the
framework of Comecon. In 1981, the Soviet Union alone absorbed 29.3 per cent
of Hungarian exports and The considerable respect which Kádár had
gained over the years was amply demonstrated by his visits to western
capitals. Talks in Despite Kádár's unchallenged moral authority
at home and the fact that his pragmatism and sense of realism had created
significant freedoms for There was also a great deal of uncertainty
as to whether an internal power struggle over his succession would upset the
political stability which Kádár had achieved during his time in office. Any
such struggle might result in a period of confusion which would endanger the
Hungarian experiment of embarking on a separate 'national' path to Socialism,
and would adversely affect Given the danger that a sudden slowing down
of the pace of reform might reopen the gulf that existed between the party
and the population, the government thought that the only real guarantee of
peace at home lay in maintaining the new freedoms or even developing them
further. Every effort would have to be made to spare the population any
reduction in the availability of consumer goods. But the greatest risk to THE DEMISE OF 'REAL EXISTING SOCIALISM' IN The greatest challenge the Hungarian
government faced after 1980 was the problem of creating a balanced and stable
economy. After thorough consultation with Soviet planners a Sixth Five Year
Plan was implemented on 1 January 1981. But hopes that this would achieve
greater economic stability and maintain the standard of living by improving
economic efficiency and shifting the emphasis of production in favour of more
profitable products for the international market proved illusory. It was
clear within its first two years of implementation that performance levels
had not been sufficiently raised to increase per capita income to the extent
the planners had envisaged. The consequence was that the average annual
increase in the price of consumer items caused a decline in purchasing power
of 4.6 per cent per annum in real terms. Since less capital was available for
investment, the only prospect of stabilising the economy was to improve
profitability and raise productivity. Hungary's economic experts were
confronted by a growing number of difficult problems: the industrialised
West, undergoing a period of recession and high unemployment, adopted
protectionist policies; Hungary's Socialist partners, including Poland and
Rumania, failed to deliver promised consignments; and at home increased
private consumption exceeded the planners' estimates as a result of the
population's overwhelming desire to convert earnings into hard goods. With a foreign debt amounting to almost 9
billion US dollars in 1982 and an acute shortage of foreign exchange
threatening the repayment of interest and capital on loans from the West, the
government's successful application to join the International Monetary Fund
on 6 May 1982 and Hungary's membership of the World Bank, announced on 7 July
1982, helped overcome the country's immediate economic problems by means of
short-term borrowing. But the impact of the credit crisis forced the
government to take action in late 1982 to reduce its net debt by a further
drastic reduction in investment, surplus stockpiling and increasing
industrial development funding. These measures were also accompanied by price
rises and, more importantly, import restrictions. But by successfully
increasing its exports to Comecon countries by 3 per cent, along with its
exports to developing countries, On a visit to Party and government insistence on improving
Hungary's foreign trade balance, reducing its foreign debt by stimulating
exports and producing import substitutes at the cost of falling incomes and
reduced private consumption proved relatively ineffective. About 2.6 billion
dollars, representing 58 per cent of export earnings, had to be used to repay
capital and interest payments on the country's 11.8 billion dollar foreign
debt. At the Thirteenth Party Congress, held at the end of March 1985, Kádár
admitted that his government's consistent policy of austerity had resulted in
an overall drop in the standard of living, and that alongside pensions and
social benefits the value of wages had also fallen in real terms. The Seventh
Five Year Plan, which incorporated the new reforms, failed to fulfil
expectations. The government had promised to achieve a 17 per cent increase in
the national income, a 15 per cent increase in industrial production and wage
increases of up to 18 per cent. By mid-1986, however, earnings had risen by
7.2 per cent while industrial production increased by only 1.2 per cent in
the same period. The national budget deficit grew from 14 billion forints in
1985 to 45 million in the following year (6.6 per cent of total government
revenue). In the same period the foreign trade deficit rose to 30.3 billion
forints. Between September 1983 and January 1985
drastic price increases on basic foodstuffs, services and utilities resulted
in a rise in the cost of living. Transport rose by 60 per cent, energy by 30
per cent and dairy products by 28 per cent, but without any significant
effect on the budget deficit. In the hope of further reducing state control
in favour of market forces and private enterprise, the government carried out
its threat to close down unprofitable businesses, create redundancies and
break up large-scale concerns into smaller, more manageable medium-sized
firms, but these measures also failed to revive the economy. Thus, at the
Twenty-Fifth Congress of the Hungarian Trade Union Federation on 14 February
1986, its chairman, Sándor Gáspár, himself a Politburo member, sharply
criticised the government's economic strategy, accusing it of encouraging
inflation, reducing purchasing power and causing pensioners considerable
hardship. He also condemned the reduced status of the 200,000 members of the
technical intelligentsia who had once been highly valued but were now forced
to supplement their falling incomes by taking on a second job outside their
normal full-time employment. By the early 1980s the government felt
obliged to legalise the so-called 'black economy', thus acknowledging the
existence of a viable alternative economy operating independently of
bureaucratic controls. The inefficiency of the state-controlled sector had
produced a situation in which about a half of Despite all the problems and setbacks, During the initial phase of talks on the
renewal of the Warsaw Pact, In March 1985 Mikhail Gorbachev was elected
the new General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party. Since he himself was
looking for ways to stimulate and improve the efficiency of the tultified
Soviet economy, he viewed the Hungarian 'model' in an unprejudiced light.
After meeting Kádár on 25 September 1985 the official communiqué stressed the
'importance in principle of the course adopted to accelerate socio-economic
development in both countries'. The Hungarians were, however, obliged to
accept that an 'all-round increase in production' could be achieved only by
making 'better use of the historical advantages of Socialism and all the
possibilities of the Socialist planned economy' as well as by 'actively
emphasising the social, ideological and spiritual values of Socialist
construction, acknowledging . . . all that Socialist construction entails'.
The Hungarians could not ignore this 'advice', dependent as their economy was
on Soviet raw materials. At the meeting of the Political Advisory Committee
of the Warsaw Pact, held in At this stage there was no sign of any
agreed successor who would prove acceptable to all elements in the party.
György Aczél, Kádár's loyal disciple who had long been regarded as his heir
apparent, was already almost as old as his party boss. Moreover, as an
advocate of It certainly
seemed at this stage that the internally strengthened MSzMP was still a
stable factor in Hungarian society. Fluctuations in its 870,000 membership
were relatively small. Occasionally members were forced to leave because of
serious lapses such as dereliction of duty, irresponsible behaviour towards
others, alcoholism and corruption, but more commonly membership was suspended
for failure to demonstrate an active commitment. The rise in the proportion
of old to young members was, however, a cause for concern, since only 7.5 per
cent were below the age of 30 and the average age had risen to 47 years.
Another concern was that women, comprising of only 26.3 per cent of members,
were greatly under-represented in the party. At the Thirteenth Party Congress
in March 1985 it was proudly pointed out that 62.4 per cent of members were workers
and 10.8 per cent were peasants. White-collar workers made up a further 16.1
per cent, those in 'intellectually creative employment' 9.2 per cent and
'others' 1.5 per cent. These last three groups were over-proportionately
represented. Over 800,000 young people between the ages of 14 and 28 were
organised in the 25,600 branches of the Communist Youth league (KISZ), while
children under the age of 14 belonged to the Young Pioneers (Úttöorők).
The party-controlled Patriotic Popular Front, which included representatives
of the country's churches and ethnic minorities, had 112,400 members
organised into 4,000 local branches. These were mainly involved in canvassing
for the party at elections and mobilising popular support for the
government's social and political measures. The national daily newspapers, like the
Party's Népszabadság, the government's Magyar Hirlap, the
Patriotic Popular Front's Magyar
Nemzet and the trade-union
newspaper Népszava, enjoyed a press monopoly and toed the party line
exclusively. They, together with 1,720 other regularly published regional and
local newspapers, had a daily circulation of over 3 million copies. There
were also 34 weekly newspapers whose circulation amounted to over 7 million
copies and 16 magazines published by various religious groups. Among these
were the Catholic newspapers Uj
Ember (New Man) and Katolikus Szó (Catholic News) with circulations of 90,000 and
13,800 respectively. A press law of 21 March 1986 confirmed the citizen's
right to information and instructed journalists to convey, alongside coverage
of international events, 'a true picture of political, economic, social and
cultural life in Hungary'. Together with its control over the allocation of
newsprint, the expectation that publishers would exercise self-censorship and
observe relevant statutory obligations allowed the party to influence both
the selection of information and the tenor of its reporting. Television,
which broadcast over 100 hours on two channels each week, had gained steadily
in importance as a major source of information for the general public. Yet,
despite the state's control of the major instruments for influencing public
opinion, protests against the Communists' monopoly of power were increasingly
voiced. One of these
voices belonged to the traditional populist movement. Originating in popular
defiance of aristocratic rule, it gained fresh impetus in the inter-war
period and during the Second World War when the arch-conservative Horthy
régime blocked every effort to bring about social, economic and cultural
reform. Despite having different aims, the populists had supported the
setting up of the Communist régime, only to become later the victims of major
persecution between 1949 and 1953. After mid-November 1956 they resumed their
opposition to the system and were attacked for supporting Imre Nagy's
policies and advocating a multi-party state. After regaining some freedom in
the more liberal cultural climate of the late 1960s, they began to highlight
the deplorable situation of the persecuted Magyar minorities in Hungary's
neighbouring states. In contrast to the party and government, who had to
exercise extreme caution in foreign policy, they demanded government action
to remedy the situation. They also began to focus attention on various social
problems, ranging from the causes and effects of the country's high divorce
rate and widespread alcoholism to the reasons for the alarming increase in
mental illness and large number of suicides. Their fearless criticism of
'real existing' Socialism made the authorities increasingly apprehensive. Also viewed with suspicion, though they long
refrained from criticising official ideology, were those groups belonging to
the reformist and revisionist opposition which had first emerged around 1955
and comprised mainly economic reformers, sociologists and representatives of
the Lukács school. Against the demands of the Budapest school of sociologists
for greater democracy and pluralism, the party stuck to its official goal of
creating a monolithic society based firmly on the ideal, 'one ideology, one
nation'. Only from the late 1970s onwards did the MSzMP leadership hesitantly
begin to consider implementing the process of modernisation as part of the
'constructive' advancement of Marxism-Leninism, though to avoid the much
feared charge of 'revisionism' the overdue political reforms were justified
as an unavoidable by-product of Hungary's economic changes. At the beginning
of 1984 the party announced its willingness to allow 'an even greater measure
of Socialist democracy' and 'self-administration' to accompany its new ideas
on economic policy. Pointing to the 'unsatisfactory development of party
democracy', the party's organisational statute was amended with a view to
enlarging its social basis while also increasing the independence of the
party organisation and the participation of party members in decision-making.
The new party statute, approved at the Thirteenth Party Congress in March 1985,
no longer defined the political function and social basis of the party
exclusively in terms of the 'working class'. It now allowed for the genuine
prospect of developing a 'class position' for the technical intelligentsia
which was being viewed as increasingly important. n addition, a 15-man-strong Constitutional
Committee began work on 6 June 1984. Its task was to help 'secure the
constitutional social order' and ensure that Hungary's laws, decrees and
statutory measures were in harmony with the constitution. An electoral
reform, approved by the Hungarian parliament on 23 December 1983, also tried
to accommodate the widespread demand for more democracy and pluralism by
allowing several candidates who did not have to be members of the MSzMP to
stand for election in each of the country's 355 constituencies. The much
vaunted 'widening of the opportunity for the masses to participate' in
elections only amounted, however, to citizens being allowed to nominate
candidates other than the two nominated by the Patriotic Popular Front. When
elections on this basis were held for the first time on 8 and 22 June 1985,
93.9 per cent of the country's 7,728 million registered voters decided the
composition of the new parliament. In the first round, 25 of the 71 alternative
candidates who stood against the party's official candidates were elected to
the National Assembly. Since no one candidate gained an absolute majority in
45 of the constituencies, a second round had to be held. This took place on
22 June and resulted in the election of 18 'independents'. The relatively
free nature of these elections was without parallel in any of the other
Communist states of eastern Europe and won Hungary considerable respect
abroad, despite the limitations and inadequacies which undoubtedly still
existed. On the other hand, the government did almost
everything in its power to obstruct the work of critical intellectuals, who,
like the sociologist, Ágnes Heller, tried to investigate the relevance to
Hungary of social democratic or western democratic ideas of a pluralistic
society. The party's desire to avoid, if at all possible, major conflict and
any changes which might undermine the system's internal stability actually
encouraged the emergence of a progressive reformism subscribing to Eurocommunist
ideas. But since the realisation of the new ideas implied a rejection of
Soviet-style Socialism, and since the adoption of a multi-party system
inevitably threatened the party's institutionalised monopoly of power, they
were firmly opposed by the party's more orthodox wing. Prior to 1988 Hungary's opposition groups
made no attempt to join forces nor stage any sensational incidents. Ideas
encountered in academic journals, magazine articles and smaller discussion
circles did not initially pose a significant threat to the régime. While the
opposition was, of course, perceived as hostile, the government was content
to keep it under surveillance and rarely resorted to oppressive measures.
Thus, a 'second' culture which walked a narrow tightrope between being
tolerated and being declared illegal was able to emerge alongside the
official state-sponsored culture. After 1985, however, the government made
every effort to drive illegalSamizdat publications underground. Among
several loosely connected groups the oldest was Szeta, founded by Ottilia
Solt. Its goal was to improve the conditions of the country's many poor
people, such as pensioners, gypsies and unemployed youth, by means of public
donations. Other dissident groups gathered round the philosopher, János Kis,
who had been dismissed from his post in the Academy of Sciences in the late
1970s, and Gábor Demszky, whose AB publishing house published proscribed
books and journals. Its monthly magazine Hírmondó (the Messenger), the
underground magazine Beszélő (the Spokesman) and AB Tájékoztató (AB Information) were all
publications which provided the opposition with its main platform for
discussing contemporary issues. One group calling itself MO concerned itself
with the events of October and November 1956, while the circle around the
biologist and journalist, János Vargha, took up ecological issues and
highlighted the serious evironmental damage which would be caused to the
endangered forested marshlands along the middle Danube if the joint
Czechoslovakian-Hungarian project to build a power station at
Gabčikovo-Nagymaros were to go ahead. The various groups of dissidents,
which the government lumped together by labelling them as the 'opposition',
did not try to conceal their small numbers. But while only about 50 people
actively organised and promoted their various causes, there were about 200
sympathisers who could be described as having been 'regular workers' and a
further 500 people who acted as 'occasional helpers'. This '0.1 per cent', as
the dissidents liked to call themselves, made no claim to being
representative of society as a whole, but saw it as their task to encourage
any sign of the non-conformist thinking which was spreading rapidly
throughout Hungarian society at the time. The relative consideration which the
authorities showed towards this numerically small 'opposition' was made
easier by the dissidents' own assurance that they would respect Hungary's
internal and external situation and campaign primarily for 'important
political goals' which they maintained could be achieved 'without shaking the
foundations of the system'. Arguing that economic reforms could succeed only
if they were accompanied by appropriate political changes, the dissidents
called for a more significant role for parliament and the setting up of an
independent committee of experts to review the state of the economy and
redistribute social burdens. They called for new trade-union legislation,
arguing that elected shop stewards should in future be responsible to those
who elected them rather than to the party. They also suggested that
arbitration procedures to settle conflicts between employers and employees
should be so regulated as to make it possible to 'apply pressure legally' in
the form of strike action. The government's intention to stop subsidising
loss-making concerns gave rise to the suggestion that workers should either
forsake their wages for a limited period or accept a temporary period of
unemployment while assured receipt of appropriate social benefits. Alternatively,
the company in question could be run as a cooperative. It was also argued
that the state should show greater respect for the rule of law and observe
strictly the principle of judicial independence. Yet, despite the fact that
these suggestions were realistic, the party leadership made it clear that it
was not prepared to enter into any discussion with the dissident opposition
on the grounds that a dialogue with non-Communists might undermine the
party's position. Relations between the party and the Catholic
Church remained relatively harmonious. It seemed very unlikely that there
would be any repeat of open conflict between church and state once the
government tried to unite both sides in what it described as a 'long-term and
fundamental community of interest'. The clergy had managed to secure a
relatively comfortable position for itself by cooperating with the régime.
The long-serving head of the State Office for Religious Affairs, Imre Miklós,
did, however, continue to see to it that the Church did not increase its
influence unduly. The government made no concessions regarding religious
teaching outside of state schools, nor in allowing the building of new
churches. Complaints about the growing indifference of Hungary's citizens,
their unwillingness to make personal and financial sacrifices, their consumer
mentality and spiritual apathy, became common. According to a survey
published by the government newspaper, Magyar
Hírlap, in July 1980, 50 to 60
per cent of Magyars described themselves as 'religious', although only a
third of these Christians -- about a sixth of the population -- regularly
attended church services. Between 70 and 75 per cent of the country's rural
inhabitants and about a third of its townspeople described themselves as
'believers'. The vast majority of Hungarians, over 80 per cent of the
population, still requested church ceremonies for marriages, baptisms
and funerals, although, according to the survey, only a quarter of those
between the ages 20 and 29 said they believed in God. The complaint,
occasionally heard even from the Catholic bishops, that the government was
hampering the work of the Church was indeed justified. Although in 1982 the
papal nuncio, Poggi, had reached agreement with the government on future
procedures for nominating new bishops, it was not until long after the death
of Cardinal László Lékai on 30 June 1986, that Pope John Paul II was able to
appoint a successor, László Paskai, the former archbishop of Kalocsa, as
Hungary's primate on 6 March 1987. The Church hierarchy and the government did,
however, cooperate closely in suppressing the so-called 'fundamental
congregations'. These groups which arose spontaneously, mainly among the
young, criticised the bishops for their apparent loyalty to the régime and no
longer saw Catholicism as providing an essential ideological counterweight to
the Communist state. They were consequently denounced as 'hostile to the
government'. On several occasions bishops suspended clergymen who had openly
expressed a commitment to this lay movement. Some priests were even arrested
and imprisoned on charges of 'conspiracy and unauthorised religious
instruction'. Even the Vatican felt obliged on 16 May 1983 to criticise
strongly members of the 'fundamental congregations' who had spoken out against
universal conscription and for the creation of a 'peace corps' alternative to
national service. It was argued that by criticising the obsequiousness of the
bishops and stagnation in the life of the Church and its clergy the
congregations were endangering 'the unity of the Catholic Church in Hungary'
and upsetting the 'good relationship between the government and the
faithful'. Two groups, in particular, deserve to be
mentioned in this connection. The Bulányists, named after the Piarist priest,
György Bulányi, were an active Catholic youth organisation based in Budapest.
Its members were strongly committed on social issues and demanded greater
freedom and genuine independence for the Church. The Regnumists, whose
origins lay in a Catholic youth movement of the inter-war period, insisted on
the moral and religious education of youth and concentrated mainly on giving
private religious instruction. Both had links with the unofficial peace
movement which was supported by young people, conscientious objectors and
priests. This group sought closer contact with like-minded groups in the
West. Hungary's non-Catholic religious
denominations, which were very much smaller in number, also made their peace
with the state authorities and the MSzMP. This had a lot to do with the fact
that the government rewarded churchmen who behaved themselves and showed a
willingness to conform with generous pay-outs amounting annually to 74.6
billion forints. The largest of the Protestant churches was the Calvinist
Reformed Church. Its membership numbered about 2 million, making it four
times larger than the Lutheran Church with only 430,000 members. Among the
remaining churches Baptists, Unitarians and Methodists formed the biggest
groups. An estimated 13,000 citizens belonged to the Orthodox Church. Of
Hungary's estimated 80,000 Jewish citizens, approximately 70,000 lived in
Budapest. The country's 60 Jewish communities had over 30 synagogues and
places of worship served by 30 rabbis. Apart from a Jewish hospital, three
old-people's homes and a secondary school, the Jewish community possessed
eastern Europe's last remaining rabbinical school, consisting of six
professors and ten students. In June 1985 the first synagogue to be built
since the Second World War was formally consecrated in Siófok on Lake
Balaton. In 1987 Hungary's obvious efforts to combat any discrimination
against its Jewish minority were formally acknowledged when the executive
committee of the Jewish World Congress chose Budapest as the venue for its
first meeting ever held in a Communist country. But it was the situation of the Magyar
minorities among Hungary's neighbours that was of much greater concern to the
Hungarian leadership than the problems of a dissident opposition and
coexistence with the churches. According to estimates, about 5 million
Hungarians or people of Magyar origin resided abroad, including 1.3 million
in the West. The latter's interests were looked after by the World Federation
of Hungarians' ( Magyarok
Világszövetsége) and their attitude towards their homeland could be
described as one of loyalty or, at least, no longer hostility. But growing
anger was felt within Hungary at the way in which the political, social and
cultural rights of Magyars were being encroached upon in neighbouring
Socialist countries, where they were being increasingly forced to assimilate
with the host populations. This was especially the case in Rumania where the
autocratic regime of Nicolai Ceauşescu was becoming increasingly
intolerant of its 2 million Hungarian minority in Transylvania. In 1959,
lacking any open support from Budapest, this minority had had to accept the
closure of the Hungarian University in Kolozsvár (Rumanian Cluj-Napoca). In 1967 the
self-governing Magyar region, established fifteen years previously, was
replaced by a new administrative region and large numbers of Rumanians were
deliberately resettled in predominantly Magyar areas. The number of schools
in which Hungarian was taught was systematically reduced and heavy
restrictions were placed on Hungarian-language publications. Members of the
Hungarian minority were denied equal job opportunities, visits by relatives
were made extremely difficult and anyone applying to leave the country
suffered negative consequences. Consequently, Magyars felt they were being
treated as second-class citizens. Ceauşescu, for his part, believed that
his intolerant minorities policy, which also threatened the existence of the
Transylvanian Saxons, would help him achieve his main aim. As he expressed
it, 'In the foreseeable future there will be no more national minorities in
Rumania: only one Socialist nation.' For a long time the Kádár régime exercised
remarkable restraint. But at the beginning of the 1980s, as the harassment
and grievances of Rumania's Hungarian minority increased, two meetings of
'frank and open discussion' took place between government and party officials
from both countries in the summer and winter of 1982. These failed, however,
to reconcile the two sides. Supported by opposition dissidents and sections
of the Hungarian press, the Hungarian Samizdat magazine, Ellenpontok (Counterpoint), which
was circulated within Rumania, highlighted the dramatically deteriorating
situation of the Magyar minority. Its staff also directed an appeal by
Hungarian dissidents on behalf of their co-nationals to the European
Conference on Security and Cooperation which was meeting in Madrid. Since the
Rumanian government's attitude continued to harden and petty-minded
harassment of the more vocal spokesmen of the Hungarian minority increased,
the government in Budapest attacked the 'flagrant violation of bilateral
agreements' and considered similar retaliatory measures. After encountering
the Rumanian government's opposition to granting its minorities greater
autonomy, the first European Cultural Forum, held between 13 October and 25
November 1985 in Budapest and attended by representatives of the 35 signatory
states at the European Conference on Security and Cooperation, broke up
without producing any final accord. The apparent failure to obtain a
satisfactory solution to the growing threat of ethnic conflict in Rumania
damaged Kádár's prestige and that of the party. For the 600,000 Hungarians who lived along
Southern Slovakia's border with Hungary and who made up 4 per cent of
Czechoslovakia's population, conditions, though not ideal, were more
favourable. Here the Hungarians had their own schools and cultural
organisations, and cross-border contact was permitted. But here, too,
Hungarian dissidents complained of a 'step-by-step displacement of the
language and culture' and accused the authorities of demanding loyalty to the
host country to the extent that Hungarians were losing their ethnic identity.
The 504,000 Magyars who lived under Yugoslavian sovereignty and predominantly
inhabited the border region of the Voivodina also appeared to enjoy more
tolerable conditions. Regular meetings held between the Hungarian and
Yugoslavian leaders before 1991 repeatedly called for 'every socio-economic,
cultural, educational and other opportunity' to be granted to the ethnic
minorities on both sides of the border in order to strengthen and consolidate
relations between their two countries. The Hungarian government, for its part,
boasted that it had made a complete break with its country's aggressively
intolerant policy towards minorities in the past, claiming that it had granted
them exemplary protection. This referred to Hungary's 230,000 Germans (who
had in fact already been largely assimilated), 130,000 Slovaks scattered
across the country, 30,000 South Slavs and 25,000 Rumanians. At the beginning
of August 1985 Hungary's ethnic Germans were expressly encouraged to
cultivate their own culture and language. But painstaking efforts to make
Hungary's 320,000 gypsies settle permanently and integrate into society met
with only limited success. Concern for the situation of co-nationals
was passionately debated in Hungary, but received little media coverage. The
discussion raised the spectre of the extremely militant Magyar nationalism of
the past and threatened to revive the problem which had dominated the
country's history in the inter-war period, that of revising the borders laid
down by the Trianon Treaty. The MSzMP thus found itself in a quandary. On the
one hand, the need for solidarity among the Socialist Bloc countries meant
that its hands were tied against doing more for the Hungarian minorities. On
the other hand, it could not allow the problem to be exploited solely by
dissidents and nationalists, since a groundswell of nationalism would have
jeopardised its programme of reforms, against which there were already
sufficient reservations among Hungary's Socialist partners. This could have
undermined the domestic stability which the régime had achieved. Faced with
the growing problems of implementing economic reforms and maintaining a more
liberal climate, Hungary was particularly sensitive and vulnerable to
external pressures. In the rest of eastern Europe Communist
party ideologues criticised the Hungarians for the freedom given to their
scientists, playwrights, artists and film-makers. As part of its strategy of
defusing internal criticism the Hungarian leadership had deliberately
cultivated the arts and what it termed 'human intelligence'. Poets and
writers not only received material privileges, better career opportunities
and generous social benefits, they were given sufficient scope to publicise
their works as long as they did not frivolously attack prevailing norms and
exercised selfcensorship. Gyula Illyés, Miklós Mészőly, Iván Mándy,
Miklós Szentkuthy and Géza Ottlik all enjoyed considerable respect. But the
support given to György Konrád for his first two novels ( The Visitor and The Founder of the State) was
withdrawn when he collaborated with the sociologist, Iván Szelényi, in
producing a report on 'The Intelligentsia on the Road to becoming a Class
Power'. The subsequent ban on his publications caused him to leave the
country for a time. Others, like the essayist and scriptwriter, Sándor
Csoóri, or the poet, György Petri, whose works were banned on account of
their 'undesirable' subject matter, nevertheless found ways of having their
volumes appear in Hungary. The cultural journals Élet és Irodalom (Life and Literature) and Mozgó Világ(World in Motion),
which were especially popular with the younger generation, provided an
important forum of intellectual discussion and pushed forward the barriers of
social and intellectual freedom. Film-makers like Miklós Jancsó ( The Round
Up and The Confrontation), Károly Makk ( Love), Péter Gothár ( Time Stands
Still) and, above all, István Szabó ( Mephisto) won international acclaim for
their productions. In the autumn of 1986 a bitter conflict
broke out between the Hungarian Writers' League and the MSzMP after the
provincial cultural journal, Tiszatáj,
was banned from publication for
printing poems critical of the régime. At the same time, the works of István
Csurka, a prominent writer and exponent of traditional Hungarian
folk-literature, were also banned after Radio Free Europe had broadcast one
of his short stories. When, at the League's annual meeting on 28 November,
three-quarters of the governing committee refused to censure colleagues for
signing a declaration on the thirtieth anniversary of the 1956 Uprising,
uproar ensued. The offending statement had also been published abroad. The
influential Central Committee Secretary for Agitation and Propaganda,
János Berecz, delivered an intransigent speech threatening to dissolve the
League. Since those who opposed censorship subsequently won a majority in
elections to the committee, several writers professing loyalty to the party
walked out of the League on the grounds that its views were incompatible with
their principles. They subsequently announced their intention to found a new
writers' organisation. These events demonstrated that the rapidly growing
popular dissatisfaction caused by the worsening economic situation had
reached artistic circles which were now also calling for leadership changes. Figures for the previous economic year,
published by the Central Office of Statistics in mid-February 1987, could not
conceal the fact that the economy had again failed to meet the planners'
targets and that the standard of living had fallen even further. Hungary's
Gross Domestic Product had grown by only 0.9 per cent in real terms. New
legislation introduced in late 1986 allowing the closure of bankrupt or
chronically insolvent state-run enterprises, was not enough to eliminate the
growing budget deficit. The government's intention to close down about 60
firms employing 200,000 workers resulted in general disquiet and caused the
orthodox elements in the party to predict that the continuing reforms would
fatally weaken if not destroy the state welfare system. The pace of reform began to slow down as it
became clear that the new competitiveness caused by participating in world
markets had resulted in an inflationary spiral at home; that changing
employment patterns meant the system could no longer artificially maintain
full employment; and that freedom from 'the chains of
bureaucratic-administrative control' could only be achieved by improving management
efficiency. During preliminary talks between Kádár and Gorbachev in November
1986, and discussions between prime minister Lázár and his Soviet
counterpart, Ryshkov, it was probably made clear to the Hungarians that they
could not expect generous Soviet assistance to help them overcome their
problems, though they could count on the Kremlin's goodwill and backing for
introducing further economic reforms. But since they could not rely on the
old party elements to make forward-looking decisions, it seemed clear that
changes in the leadership were going to be necessary before any new strategy
could be introduced. On one thing both sides agreed: since Kádár was so
closely identified with the changes that had already taken place in Hungary,
he remained for the time being the indispensable leader of the MSzMP. |
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