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Turkish-Armenian
War and the fall of the First Republic By Andrew Andersen and Georg Egge
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Escalation of Tension between Armenia and Nationalist Turkey and
the Failed Alliance with Georgia, 08/1920 – 09/1920 The aftermath of the Treaty of
Sevres was marked by the following paradox. On the one hand, Armenia was
supposed to take over the territory now legally assigned to her by the
victorious Allies and was willing to do so. But on the other hand, the
Turkish Kemalists who in fact, controlled the territory assigned to Armenia
together with most of Anatolia, did not recognize the Treaty that had been
signed (although never ratified) by the powerless government of Sultan Mehmed
VI based in Constantinople and were not planning to give up any territory
that they considered Misak-i-Milli
(Turkish heartland). Furthermore, from the Kemalist/Nationalist perspective, Misak-i-Milli included not only
Western Armenia but at least half of the territory controlled by the Armenian
Republic in August, 1920 (all the territory west of the Russo-Turkish border
of 1877). Facing the above paradox the Democratic Republic of Armenia could
enforce provisions of the Treaty of Sevres only through successful military
action, but was the tiny republic of the South Caucasus capable of completing
that task? By the end of summer of the year 1920, Armenia could boast less
than 30 000 soldiers against the 50 000 strong Turkish army of Nizam
Karabekir Pasha stationed at her pre-treaty borders[3]
despite the fierce fighting going on in Western Anatolia between the Kemalist
Turks and Greeks who were trying to secure their own gains as per the Treaty
of Sevres. In addition to the regular troops, Karabekir could rely on
numerous irregulars who were also prepared and willing to fight for the
Turkish case against Armenians. As for the Armenian army that was believed to
be the best trained and the most disciplined among other armies of the South
Caucasus, it would hardly be an exaggeration to say that it was exhausted -
morally, physically and financially as a result of the series of almost
non-stop warfare starting with 1915. In terms of international support, one
could add to the above that the events that followed the Treaty of Sevres in
the South Caucasus clearly demonstrated Armenia could hardly count on any
serous external help while the Kemalist (Nationalist) Turkey enjoyed both
diplomatic and military support on behalf of the Soviet Russia and its
puppet-state of Soviet Azerbaijan[4].
Armenian officer,
August / 1920 Several weeks before the treaty of Sevres
was signed, Armenian border troops entered the district of Olti, the
territory that formally did not belong to Turkey but in fact, was controlled
by the irregulars of local Muslim warlords ( predominantly Kurdish ones) as
well as by some regular Turkish troops under the command of Turkish and
Azerbaijani officers who were stationed there in breach of the Armistice of
Mudros[5].
The Armenian advance began on June 19, 1920, and by June 22 most of the district
including the towns of Olti and coal-reach Peniak were put under Armenian
jurisdiction[6]
(see Map 8). From Turkish Nationalist perspective, it was the incursion of
the Armenian troops into the district of Olti that served as an official pretext
for the new Turkish-Armenian war. One should add to the above that the war
could have been avoided if the governments of Armenia and Georgia would have
succeeded in the establishment of a military alliance aimed at preservation
of their independence and territorial integrity. The government of the First
republic undertook some demarches in that direction in mid-August, 1920[7]
largely under the influence of Lt.-Colonel Claude Stokes (new British chief
Commisioner in the South Caucasus) who was a strong believer that
Armeno-Georgian alliance could have not only secured the area from the new
Turkish expansion but could have also resulted in forcing the Soviets out of
Azerbaijan[8]. The
possibility of such an alliance was a great concern for the Turkish
Nationalists even in the midst of the Turkish-Armenian war that started 40
days upon the signing of the treaty of Sevres[9].
Nevertheless, the projected Armeno-Georgian alliance never occurred due to
the inability of the governments of both nations to overcome their differences
and due to the efforts of Turkish diplomacy in Tiflis. The First Phase of the Turkish-Armenian War and the
Soviet-Turkish Invasion of Zanghezur 09/1920 – 10/1920 It would be beyond the framework of this
essay to provide a detailed analysis of the Turkish-Armenian War
that broke out in early September, 1920, when the Turkish army under
Karabekir enforced by local Muslim militiamen, launched a full-scale
offensive along the whole perimeter of Turkish-Armenian border. We would only
take the liberty to mention that the leadership of the First Republic
definitely under-estimated both military and ideological strength of Turkish
nationalists overestimating, at the same time, their own resources and forces
as well as the possible support on behalf of their Western Allies. On
September 24 the war was officially declared. Within the following week,
the defense lines of Armenian forces collapsed and the Turks took over the
towns of Sarykamysh, Kaghyzman, Ighdyr and Merdenik (see Map 9). The
advancing Turkish armies were devastating the area and wiping out the civil
Armenian population that did not have time or willingness to flee.
Simultaneously, some of Armenian regiments reportedly started performing
ethnic cleansing in Kars and Erevan counties that still remained under
Armenian control. While Armenia was busy trying
to withstandthe new Turkish aggression, the Soviets made one more attempt to
“pasify” Zanghezur. On September 3 the
components of the 11th red Army under General Nesterovsky launched
an offensive against Njdeh pressing his fighters southwards beyond Kapan and
Katar. Three weeks later the combined Soviet-Turkish and Soviet-Azerbaijani
forces started incursion from Nakhichevan and Jabrail in the direction of
Meghri. Despite such dramatic development the militias of Zanghezur succeeded
in defeating the enemy groupings one after another and by the end of the
second week of October they re-conquered Kapan and Katar from Nesterovsky and
chased the Soviet-Turkish corps under the cpmmand of Veysel Bey back to
Nakhichevan[10]
(see Map 9). Meanwhile, during the two-week lull that
followed after the loss of Penyak, Sarykamysh, Peniak and Merdenek, Georgia
attempted to take over the remaining part of the disputed Ardahan (see Map 9). On
October 1 1920, Georgian troops occupied the small area near Chyldyr
lake and entered the village of Okam (Gyole) on
the ”Armenian side” of Kura. The above
demarche caused indignation and protests on behalf of the Armenian Foreign
Affairs ministry especially keeping in mind that the capture of disputed area
was taken place during the negotiations Tiflis regarding the possible Armeno-Georgian
alliance aimed against Soviet and Turkish expansion. The talks ended up with
no result partially due to the efforts of Turkish diplomats in Tiflis who in
fact encouraged the government of Georgia to take over the disputed
territories to the south of Ardahan. A few days after the Georgian incursion
south of Kura, the Armenian command ordered the West Armenian regiment of
Sebough to move into Okam. In order to avoid military confrontation, the
Georgian troops evacuated Okam on October 6 and retreated back to Ardahan.
The Chyldyr sector with the town of Zurzuna remained under Georgian control,
and on October 13 it was ceremonially declared Georgian[11]. The
very same day the lull at the Turkish front was broken,
and the Republic of Armenia was in no position to re-take Chyldyr from
Georgia. Ironically, just four months later that was taken over by the Turks
as a result of the Soviet-Turkish conquest of Georgia.
Map 9. Click on the map for better resolution The Second Phase of the Turkish-Armenian War and the Fall of the
First Republic 10/1920 – 11/1920 In early October 1920, Armenian
Republic addressed the governments of Great Britain, France, Italy and other
Allied powers asking them to force the Turks to stop their offensive, but all
the desperate pleas for help seemed to fall upon deaf ears. Great Britain had
to concentrate most of her forces available in the Middle East to crush the
tribal uprisings in Mesopotamia (now Iraq). France and Italy had similar
problems in Syria, Cilicia and Adalia. The only country who provided some
support through active operations at the Turkish western front was Greece.
But Greek military support was not sufficient to ease Turkish pressure on
Armenia. As a result of the new Turkish
offensive the strategic town of Agin south of Alexandropol fell to the Turks
on November 12, and the Armenian troops were in retreat to the east along
Alexandropol – Karaklis railroad. The same day Armenian troops and population
started evacuation from Surmala crossing Aras river near Echmiadzin[15]
(see Map 10). At this point the Turkis were getting ready
for the final spurt on Erevan. Ironically enough, it was the beginning of
November when US President Wilson was done with the final sketches of the
Sevres-based Turkish-Armenian borders[16]
(see Figure 3.4). Next day the troops of Georgia
took over the Neutral Zone (the Shulavera Condominium) established between
the two countries in early 1919. The Government of Armenia gave permission to
that Georgian action in order to prevent the occupation of this disputed
territory by the Turks. However, the Georgians marched a bit further
southwards taking over the whole of the former Lori sector which Tbilisi
considered unequivocally Georgian from the first day of independence[17]
(see Map 10). After a very quick plebiscite the whole sector was annexed by
Georgia to stay within that country for another twelve months[18].
We do not possess any information that would confirm or refute whether the
procedure of that plebiscite was properly organized but in any case, the vote
of local Armenian population in favor of Georgia was rather logical keeping
in mind the circumstances of the Turkish-Armenian war and the defeat of the
First Azerbaijani Republic. Incorporation into Georgia at least guaranteed
inviolability of Armenian lives and property in the sector while possible
Turkish occupation definitely meant the loss of both. It was also reported
that on November 15 1920, Turkish Nationalist envoy in Tiflis, Colonel Kiazim
Bey gave the Georgian government guarantee of Georgia’s territorial integrity
as the reward for her neutrality in the Turkish-Armenian war and ask to grant
his country an exclusive right for the railroad sector from Sanain to the
Azerbaijani border at Poily[19].
It might be important to mention here that Georgian annexation of the
territories claimed by Armenia were never subjected to any forms of ethnic
cleansing unlike the Armenian territories taken over by Turkey and, to a
certain extent, Azerbaijan. In the middle of November the
new Turkish offensive started in the direction of Erevan from Nakhichevan. In
breach of the Soviet-Armenian Treaty of August 10, the Nakhichevan
expeditionary corps contained the components of the Soviet 11th
Army. Between November15 and 16 demoralized Armenian troops left Shakhtakhty
and all of Sharur with little or no fight and stopped Soviet-Turkish
offensive only at Davalu on November 17 1920[20]
(see Map 10). The only war theater where
Armenians had significant success was Zanghezur. In that mountainous county
Armenian forces of Colonel Njdeh successfully repelled another Soviet-Azerbaijani
invasion from Jabrail in early November and on November 09 started
counter-advance towards Goris (Gerusy). By November 22 the Armenians of
Zanghezur assisted by an expeditionary corps from Daralaghez completely
defeated the Soviet forces of General Pyotr Kuryshko (who replased
Nesterovsky in late October, 1920) and re-took the towns of Goris, Tatev,
Darabas and Angelaut expelling the reds out of the county as far as Abdalar
near the old administrative border of Karabakh[21]
(see Map 10).
Map 10. Click on the map for better resolution
The
Treaty of Alexandropol, 02.12.1920 Facing total collapse of the
First Republic, the leadership of Armenia requested an armistice for the
second time during the war, and on November 18 1920, a cease-fire agreement
was concluded[22]. A
week later, on November 24, Armenian and Turkish representatives started
peace negotiations in Alexandropol. As a precondition for any talks, the
Armenian delegation headed by Alexander Khatisov was forced to renounce the
Treaty of Sevres[23].
After having complied with that demand under pressure the Armenians presented
their border proposal. Giving up most of the former Turkish Armenia including
the cities of Bitlis, Erzurum and the coastal city of Trebizond granted at
Sevres the the delegation of the Armenian Republic asked for the small parts
of the vilayats of Van and Bitlis with the cities of Van, Bayazet, Mush and
Khnys as well as for the narrow corridor in Lazistan with the town of Rize.
As for the former Russian Armenia, the Armenians hoped to keep the whole of
the province of Erevan and the territory of Kars[24]
(see Figure 3.5). The Armenian proposal was
flatly rejected by the Turkish delegation presided by General Nizam Karabekir
Pasha as absolutely non-realistic and even insulting. Instead, the Armenian delegation
was to accept unconditionally the Turkish provisions that were quite severe. Armenia
was to disarm most of her military forces and cede more than a half of her
pre-war territory. All of the Kars territory with the districts of
Sarykamysh, Kars, Kaghyzman, Olti and the Armenian sector of Ardahan district
was to be ceded to Turkey, as well as the county of Surmala in the province
of Erevan with the city of Ighdyr and Mount Ararat. The county of Nakhichevan
combined with the Sharur sector of the county of Sharur-Daralaghez were to be
placed under Turkish protectorate (see Figure 3.5).
Self-explanatory, Armenia was not receiving any parts of the Turkish Armenia
that was now referred to as “Eastern Anatolia” by the Turks. The Armenian
Republic was also supposed to limit her relations with the Allied Powers[25].
According to Karabekir, the Turkish-drafted border between Turkey and Armenia
was based on “ethnical principle” that could not justify incorporation into
Armenia of any territories where Armenians had not formed majority before the
outbreak of the First World War[26].
Figure 3.5 At 2 o’clock in the morning on
December 3, the new peace treaty between Turkey and Armenia was signed in
Alexandropol by Karabekir and Khatisov. At the very last moment the Armenian
delegation attempted to reach agreement on a few border adjustments that
would leave Armenia with Sharur-Nakhichevan, Mount Ararar and the ruins of
Ani (mediaeval capital of Armenia) in the district of Kars, but their Turkish
counterparts were inexorable. The only concession granted to the Armenians
was some smaller territories in Aghbaba sector of the district of Kars to the north-west of Alexandropol[27].
The new Armeno-Turkish border was drawn, and it virtually never changed up to
these days.
While the Armenian government
was trying to terminate the lost war against the Kemalists begging the enemy
for peace no matter how harsh and humiliating its conditions could be, the
Soviets were taking over what was left of the First Republic. As early as on November 19
1920, the Soviet plenipotentiary in Erevan Boris Legran and his staff started
the arrangement of the bloodless Sovietization of Armenia following the
instructions from the Kremlin. The Dashnakist leadership of Armenia were to
be persuaded that that would be the only way to save Armenian people as well
as some form of the Armenian statehood[29]. At the same time, the Kavburo in Baku dominated by
Orjonikidze and Stalin was more impatient about the rapid conquest of
exhausted Armenia than Lenin and Chicherin in Moscow. Contrary to the
instructions coming from their communist party bosses from the Central
Committee in the Kremlin, the Caucasian Bolsheviks formed the Armenian Revkom (Military Revolutionary
Committee) in Baku on November 22, 1920, that was designed to become the new
communist government of Armenia. Three days later the Revkom departed for
Kazakh were the units of the Soviet 11th Army under General Kuryshko (just
recently defeated in Zanghezur) were preparing for the invasion of Armenia.
Same day the “Special Armenian Rifle Regiment” previously stationed in
Kedabek was re-deployed to Kazakh as well. The invasion started o the night
of November 28-29 by crossing the demarcation line between Armenia and Soviet
Azerbaijan south-east of Kazakh in the direction of Karavansaray and Sevkar
(Karadash). The two towns fell into the hands of the Reds after some
resistance on behalf of Armenian border guards and militias was crushed by
the end of November 29. The attempts of Armenian General Seboukh (Arshak
Nersisian) to organize counter-offensive from Dilijan failed due to the
unwillingness of the Armenian soldiers to fight one more war against superior
enemy, and on November 30 the Red Army was already in Dilijan from where the
Sovietization of Armenia and the overthrow of the Dashnakist government was
proclaimed[30].
Later, the soviet historians portrayed that military operation as a
“communist uprising of November 28 in the district of Kazakh”[31]
(see Map 11). The Soviet invasion from Kazakh
not only shocked the Armenian government but greatly confused Boris Legran
who had not been informed on those plans of the Kavburo. Nevertheless the
reaction of the Soviet envoy was quick and effective. By December 2, Legran
successfully pressured the Parliament and the Cabinet of Simon Vratsian to
step down and officially transfer the whole power to General Dro pending the
arrival of Revkom to Erevan. Two
days later, on December 4, Dro left Erevan for the lake Sevan area where he
welcomed the Revkom and, in turn,
gave up his power to the new Bolshevik administration. Two more days later,
the first units of the red Army entered the Armenian capital[32].
That was the end of the First republic, and independent Armenian statehood
was interrupted for more than 70 years until August 1991. The Sovietization of Armenia
was accompanied by some events that at first sight, looked like the
resolution of the territorial dispute over Karabakh, Zanghezur and
Nakhichevan. As has already been mentioned above, the Soviet takeover of some
territories claimed by both Azerbaijan and Armenia did not necessarily imply
their official status. The documents and governmental correspondence of the
described period proves that Soviet envoys in the South Caucasus used to
promise the disputed territories to Azerbaijan while talking to the new Soviet
leadership in Baku or the Kemalist representatives, and to Armenia as a price
for her Sovietization when talking to Armenian communists. Sometimes they
went so far as to make absolutely unrealistic proposal according to which “no
single Armenian village will be given to Azerbaijan while no single Muslim
village will be given to Armenia”[33].
But while promising territorial concessions to all potential allies the
Kremlin tried to keep Karabakh, Nakhichevan and parts of Zanghezur as long as
possible under Soviet Russian military administration[34]. The Power Transfer Document
compiled on December 2 1920, and published in 1928 In Moscow and Paris
contained Paragraph 3 that defined the territory of the Sovietized Armenia as
recognized by the Russian Soviet Government. It included the whole of the
province of Erevan with the counties of Surmala, Sharur-Daralaghez and
Nakhichevan, Southern sector of the county of Borchalo in the province of
Tiflis, the whole of the county of Zanghezur in the province of Elizavetpol
and parts of the county of Kazakh and the territory of Kars that were not
clearly defined[35]
(see Map 11).
Ironically enough, neither the last Dashnakist government, nor the first
Soviet administration in Erevan could boast effective control even over the
half of the above territory. However, the above document is important in
terms of serious territorial concessions that the Kremlin was prepared to
offer Armenia at the very first stage of her Sovietization. Just the day before, on
December 01, 1920, a few hours prior to the power transfer in Erevan and two
days after the declaration of the Sovietization of Armenia by the
Kazakh-Dilijan Revkom, the Soviet
government of Azerbaijan (also referred to as Azrevkom) sent its greeting to its Armenian accomplices and
declared that from the moment of the fall of “the Dashnakist regime”, the
Soviet Azerbaijan was giving up the disputed territories of Karabakh,
Zanghezur and Nakhichevan in favor of the Soviet Armenia[36].
That act of the Soviet leadership of Azerbaijan was later revoked as will be
described below, but it was widely used by the Soviet propaganda to create a
myth that only the Bolsheviks with their “communist internationalism” have
proven to be the only power in the world capable to resolve long and violent
territorial disputes like the one between Armenia and Azerbaijan[37].
Map 11. Click on the map for better resolution |
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